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'WHO'S THE BOSS?": AN ANALYTICAL
AND PRACTICAL APPROACH TO
DETERMINE THE "EMPLOYER" IN A
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION
QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLAN
MEGAN McCoY*

INTRODUCTION

Imagine: You're at a cocktail party on a Friday night. Not
only are you there for the free cocktails, but also the night
presents a huge opportunity to network and make a strong name
for yourself in the community. Just out of law school, you've
embarked upon a brand new career in law by trying to make it on
your own. Relying on your business background, along with advice
from friends who started their own firms, you decided to
incorporate as a professional corporation to limit your liability as
Smith, P.C. As you're meandering throughout the room, you have
answered the same question innumerable times the same way, "I
work for myself," and then hand over your card which, underneath
your name, prominently displays your new firm's name, "Smith,
P.C." But, who really is the employer? Do you work for yourself?
Or do you work for Smith, P.C.? Who is the boss?
Over eight million people in this country are self-employed.!
Small businesses employ almost forty percent of workers in the
private sector. A majority of small employers, however, do not offer
retirement benefits.2 Seven percent of small employers feel they
* J.D., May 2005, The John Marshall Law School. I would like to dedicate
this article to: My parents, for whom I could never show enough appreciation
for their unquestioned love and encouragement and for teaching me the true
meaning of hard work; Judd, whose patience, love and support carries me
throughout law school's and life's challenges; and my sister and best friend,
who handles conflict and stress with grace, focus, and with no complaints,
provides me with constant inspiration. Also, in loving memory to Pat Gerdes,
whose passionate, tireless, and no-nonsense attitude I will always admire and
strive to maintain. The author attributes the title to the 1980s ABC television
series "Who's the Boss?"
1. According

to

the

U.S.

Bureau

of

Labor

Statistics,

http'//www.employmentspot.com/know/self'htm (last visited, May 18, 2005).

at

2. See http'//myfidelity.members.fidelity.com/investorsWeekly/index.html?

bar=p (last visited Sept. 26, 2003), excerpting from MARGARET A. MALASPINA,
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may start offering a retirement plan, while forty-three percent
indicate it is unlikely that they will make a retirement plan
available within the next two years.8 The result is a substantial
section of the work force without an important retirement savings
vehicle.
Various provisions from the Internal Revenue Code, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19744 ("ERISA"), and
the Bankruptcy Code provide incentives to employers to begin
retirement plans for the benefit of all employees. For example, the
2001 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act5
("EGTRRA") provides tax incentives to small businesses for
providing a retirement plan, but sixty-nine percent of small
employers are oblivious to these enticements.6 Increasingly, the
country is faced with the scary notion that social security benefits
may soon become depleted and the possibility that most people
will not have enough money to retire.' The government continually
attempts to address this issue by creating incentives for employers
to offer retirement plans and for employees to participate in them.
Examples of such enticements include: adding the Roth IRA to the
menu of investment vehicles,' increasing the contribution limits to
retirement plans and IRAs through provisions in EGTRRA,9
CRACKING YOUR RETIREMENT NEST EGG (WITHOUT SCRAMBLING YOUR
FINANCES): 25 THINGS YOU MUST KNOW BEFORE You TAP YOUR 401(K), IRA,
OR OTHER RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN (2003).
3. Small Employers Decrease Coverage, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS, July 1,

2003. However, almost thirty percent still offer retirement benefits. Id.
4. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (2000) and in scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code,
26 U.S.C.).
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.457-12 (as amended in 2003).
6. Small Employers Decrease Coverage, supra note 3.
7. Jay A. Soled & Bruce A. Wolk, The Minimum Distribution Rules and
Their Critical Role in Controlling the Floodgates of Qualified Plan Wealth,
2000 BYU L. REV. 587, 597 (2000). "Many studies indicate that within the next
two or three decades Social Security and Medicare will fall short of being able
to sustain themselves financially." Id.
8. Congress created the Roth IRA as part of the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788. See Michael S. McKinney, The Roth
IRA-Will It Increase Savings?, 66 TENN. L. REV. 847, 848 (1999) (stating that
Congress created the Roth IRA primarily to entice Americans into increasing
their savings because Congress recognized that the United States personal
savings rate is low when compared with the historical U.S. savings rate and
that of other industrialized countries).
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.457-12. See Kenneth S. Cohen & Jeanne E. Hoenicke,
Recent ERISA and Tax Developments, A.L.I.-A.B.A., Oct. 25-26, 2001, at 287
(summarizing the changes made to retirement savings and to tax law through
EGTRRA). Title VI of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
of 2001 increased "the dollar limits on pension plan contributions and benefits
and IRAs, simplify pension regulation, enhance pension portability, provide
new incentives to small employers to start plans and remove barriers to sound
pension funding." Id. at 289. See also John R. Thomas, Highlights of Qualified
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enforcing ERISA to protect the benefits of participants in
retirement plans, 10 and providing several tax incentives. One
common benefit and incentive for participating in a retirement
plan is the placement of assets in a trust out of reach from
creditors." However, if the owner of a business cannot partake in
such a benefit, despite setting up the business as a limited liability
professional corporation, then the "employer" will be discouraged
from starting or continuing a retirement plan and from saving for
his retirement altogether." This is the issue hinging upon the
decision by the United States Supreme Court in Yates v. Hendon.3

Retirement Plan Changes Under EGTRRA, S.C. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 2002, 12, 13
(concluding that EGTRRA symbolizes government's shift of policy toward
encouraging employers to establish qualified retirement plans and attracting
more employee participation). The changes made in EGTRRA will
significantly augment many employees' retirement plans, particularly older
employees with high compensations and, conversely, lower income employees.
Id. at 18.
10. ERISA's primary purpose is to shield participants' and their
beneficiaries' interests in employee benefit plans from creditors. David M.
Landis & Jon E. Kane, ERISA Exemptions in Bankruptcy: A Logical Solution,
66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253, 258 (1992).
11. Richard A. Naegele & Mark P. Altieri, Enemies at the Gate: Creditors'
Rights Against Tax Qualified Retirement Plans and IRAs, 29 J. PENSION
PLANNING & COMPLIANCE, Apr. 1, 2003, at 63. See Rufo v. Simpson, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 492, 524 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (refusing to include defendant O.J.
Simpson's two pension plans valued over $4 million when calculating the
damages award against him because the plans were "exempt from execution
by creditors including plaintiffs as judgment creditors of a judgment awarding
punitive damages").
12. Naegele & Altieri, supra note 11. Pension practitioners question the
legal insulation of retirement accounts from creditors due to decisions like
those coming from the Sixth Circuit.
13. 539 U.S. 957 (2003). The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari on
June 27, 2003. All similarly situated owners of businesses will be affected by
this Supreme Court decision. Naegele & Altieri, supra note 11. This Comment
was written before the Supreme Court rendered its opinion on March 2, 2004.
Yates v. Hendon, 547 U.S. 1 (2004), remanded to 365 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2004).
Justice Ginsburg authored the majority opinion, and Justices Rehnquist,
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer joined. Both Justices Scalia
and Thomas concurred in the judgment, but filed separate opinions. Justice
Ginsburg's opinion went straight to the point, stating at the beginning of her
opinion:
If the plan covers one or more employees other than the business owner
and his or her spouse, the working owner may participate on equal
terms with other plan participants. In so ruling, we reject the
position... that a business owner may rank only as an "employer" and
not also as an "employee" for purposes of ERISA-sheltered plan
participation.
Id. at 12. While this decision certainly helps buttress the legal barrier between
the corporate entity and the owner, this decision does not solve all of the
problems that exist given the current state of legislation and its definitions. As
Justice Thomas noted in his concurring opinion, now that the court
incorporated working owners into the definition of "employee," how do we now
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This Comment will begin by explaining the facts and
procedural aspects of Yates v. Hendon and the far-reaching
implications of the Supreme Court decision. Then it will provide a
basic understanding of the different statutes and common law
history involved in the Sixth Circuit's decision that led the
Supreme Court to hear this particular case. This Comment will
also define various terms, such as "participant," "employer,"
"employee," "employee benefit plan," and "beneficiary," in order to
establish a foundation for deciding the issues involved in this case.
Once provided with the fundamental groundwork, the discussion
will move into an analysis of the different federal circuits' holdings
and will examine their diverse approaches and interpretations.
Following this analysis, I will propose that the Supreme Court
overrule the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of "employer" and
include working owners as employees for the purposes of ERISA.
Also, I suggest that Congress make semantical changes to the
definitions of "employee" and "employer" in the statute to provide
a more specific and understandable interpretation for the courts
and the business world. The proposal will include many different
policy considerations that underlie congress's intent when it
enacted the Internal Revenue Code, ERISA, the Bankruptcy Code,
and general principles of corporate law. The policies behind these
legislative enactments and corporate law reflect common concerns
of both the government and the people of this country's
workforce-retirement, taxes and business-and will ultimately
decide this case.
I.

LAYING THE FOUNDATION

A. Climbing the "Court"Ladder: Facts and Procedural
History of Yates v. Hendon
Dr. Raymond B. Yates owned and operated a professional
corporation, Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C., which established and
maintained a tax-qualified profit sharing pension plan. 4 Yates
acted as the plan's administrator and trustee. 5 Dr. Yates and
three other people participated in the plan as of June 30, 1996.16
In 1989, Dr. Yates borrowed $20,000 from the retirement

define "working owner?" Id. at 46. "Hence, the existence of this exception tells
us

nothing about

whether Congress

'intended

working

owners' to be

'employees' under ERISA." Id.
14. Hendon v. Yates (In re Yates), 287 F.3d 521, 524 (6th Cir. 2002), reh'g
denied, No. 00-6023, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 12550 (6th Cir. June 20, 2002),
cert. granted, 539 U.S. 957 (2003). I.R.C. § 401 determines the tax
qualification of a profit sharing pension plan. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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plan. 7 In mid-November of 1996, three weeks before creditors filed
an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition against him, Dr.
Yates repaid the full amount of the loan, including principal and
accrued interest, 8 totaling $50,467.46."9
Fairly soon afterwards, the bankruptcy trustee, William T.
Hendon, asked the bankruptcy court to set aside the loan
repayment as a preferential transfer and to order the money to be
placed back into the debtor's estate for the benefit of Yates'
creditors.' The bankruptcy court and district court found in favor
of the bankruptcy trustee and set aside the loan repayment to
make it available to Yates' creditors.2 ' On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that due to the common law
precedent of Fugarinov. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co.'

17. Id. The loan contained a repayment term of five years at an eleven
percent interest rate. Then, in 1992, Dr. Yates extended the term for another
five years. Id.

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 524. The trustee brought the adversarial proceeding against the
plan, Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan, and the trustee, Dr.
Yates, based on 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b) and 550. Section 547(b) states:
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing
of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an
insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor
would receive if(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.
Title 11 U.S.C. § 550 provides in part:
Liability of transferee of avoided transfer
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a
transfer is avoided under section. .. 547... of this title, the trustee
may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred,
or, if the court so orders, the value of such property, from(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose
benefit such transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
21. Hendon, 287 F.3d at 523.
22. 969 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir. 1992). "[A] sole proprietor or sole
shareholder of a business must be considered an employer and not an
employee of the business for purposes of ERISA." Id.
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and Agrawal v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Co.,23 the court could
not rule any other way. 4
Yates then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review, and
ultimately reverse, the Sixth Circuit's decision. 5 The central
question facing the Court was whether Yates, as a sole
shareholder of a professional corporation, can enjoy the benefits of
ERISA's protection from creditors as an "employee" of his
practice's retirement plan.26 If deemed an employer, he will not
gain bankruptcy protection under ERISA and the Bankruptcy
Code. If he is considered an employee, he will enjoy protection and
will not have to set aside the loan amount. To answer this
question, we must first analyze the statutory language in ERISA,
the Internal Revenue Code, and the Bankruptcy Code.
B. By the Book: Analysis of PertinentERISA and Internal
Revenue Code Sections and Policies
The government enacted ERISA because of the "significant
impact that employee benefit plans have on employment, industry
and commerce," and to ensure that plan benefits exist at
retirement by prohibiting the voluntary or involuntary assignment
of benefits." When Congress enacted this massive legislation, it
23. 205 F.3d 297, 302 (6th Cir. 2000). The court rationalized that "as an
'employer,' a sole shareholder cannot qualify as a 'participant or beneficiary' in
an ERISA pension plan. The sole shareholder 'is not an ERISA entity' and
'does not have standing under the ERISA enforcement mechanisms.'" Id.
24. Hendon, 287 F.3d at 525. The court explained that under the Sixth
Circuit court rules, they must comply with the decisions of Fugarino and
Agrawal. Id. The only avenues available to overturn the strict constraints of
precedent are to file for a rehearing en banc or appeal to the Supreme Court.
Id. This is precisely what Dr. Yates decided to do.
25. 539 U.S. 957. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari on June
27, 2003. The Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief to express the
United States' views. Yates v. Hendon, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002). The Solicitor
General's brief favors Yates's contentions. See generally Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Yates v. Hendon, 539 U.S.
957 (2003) (No. 02-458), available at 2003 WL 21953912. In August and
September, petitioner Yates filed a brief supporting his position. See generally
Brief for Petitioner, Yates v. Hendon, 539 U.S. 957 (2003) (No. 02-458),
available at 2003 WL 21939861. UNUMProvident Corporation filed an amicus
curiae brief siding with Yates, as well. See generally Brief of UNUMprovident
Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Yates v. Hendon, 539
U.S. 957 (2003) (No. 02-458), available at 2003 WL 21953878. Respondent
Hendon filed his brief expressing his views on September 15, 2003. Brief for
Respondent, Yates v. Hendon, 539 U.S. 957 (2003) (No. 02-458), available at
2003 WL 22176071. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on January 13,
2004.
26. Hendon, 287 F.3d at 523.
27. Donna Litman, Bankruptcy Status of "ERISA Qualified Pension
Plans"--An Epilogue to Patterson v. Shumate, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
637, 639 (2001). ERISA primarily establishes these goals by requiring
disclosure requirements, minimum participation, vesting requirements,
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believed it very important and more efficient to do so in a widely
uniform regulation. 8 Without such uniformity, Congress feared
that widely varied state regulations would develop and ultimately
lead to increased expenses and decreased incentives for employers
to offer retirement plans.
Several tax advantages exist under the Internal Revenue
Code that encourage both employees and employers to establish
and participate in employer-sponsored plans." A tax-qualified plan
under § 401 of the Internal Revenue Code"' exempts tax from
employee contributions made from a pay deferral or the earnings
accrued over time until the employee withdraws the benefit at
retirement.32 The eventual withdrawal will be taxed at the retiree's
marginal income tax rate, which is usually lower in retirement
Employers also gain tax
than when working full-time.'
advantages by receiving immediate deductions when they make
contributions to the plan for the benefit of their employees.ERISA is divided into five titles. Titles I and II, "Protection of
Employee Benefit Rights" and "Amendments to the Internal
Revenue Code" respectively, contain relevant procedural

funding standards, and fiduciary responsibilities on plan trustees and
administrators. Id.
28. C. Scott Pryor, Rock, Scissors, Paper:ERISA, the Bankruptcy Code and
State Exemption Laws for Individual Retirement Accounts, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J.
65, 69-71 (2003).
29. Id. at 70-71. In Velis v. Kardanis, the court acknowledged Congress's
"deep and continuing interest in the preservation of pension plans, and in
encouraging retirement savings, as reflected in the statutes which have given
us ERISA, Keogh plans and IRAs." 949 F.2d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 1991). The court
found that, in the absence of fraud, Congress intended to shield pension plan
assets from creditors. Id.
30. Patricia E. Dilley, Hidden in Plain View: The Pension Shield Against
Creditors, 74 IND. L.J. 355, 399 (1999). The government allows a "tax-free
build-up" of current contributions and earnings until withdrawn at
retirement. Id. This tax advantage entices workers to provision their
retirement so that the government will not have to subsidize their retirement
for them. Id. at 399-400. This tax benefit represents just one of many tax
incentives available.
31. I.R.C. § 401. This provision sets out the requirements for qualification
for pension, profit-sharing and stock bonus plans.
32. Lisa M. Smith, Note, ERISA Qualified Pension Plans as Part of the
Bankruptcy Estate After Patterson v. Shumate, 21 CARDOzO L. REV. 2119,
2122 (2000).
33. Id.
34. Id. Of course, the plan must meet the detailed requirements under
I.R.C. § 401 in order to qualify for such treatment. If the plan qualifies as a
trust, it gains preferential tax treatment, which not only allows the deduction
for employer contributions to the trust, but also a federal income tax
exemption for the trust, and "deferral of federal income tax for participants
and beneficiaries until actual receipt of trust benefits." Litman, supra note 27,
at 640.
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information.35 Sections 514(a)36 and 206(d)(1)37 address the
preemption of state law exemptions. Congress grew concerned
with the interstate character of employee benefit plans as the
demands of growing pension plan assets and participants kept
increasing.' In this regard, Congress wanted to provide a uniform
law to "eliminat[e] the threat of conflicting or inconsistent state
and local regulation of employee benefit plans." 9 Hence, the
preemption law affords a very broad application to State or local
governmental actions.'
A pension plan must, in accordance with ERISA and the
Internal Revenue Code, contain a section that prohibits the
assignment or alienation of an employee's benefits, which is
known as the plan's "anti-alienation clause" or "spendthrift
clause."4 ' Since an employee benefit plan prohibits participants

35. Pryor, supra note 28, at 71.
36. The section provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of
this title and title IV shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described
in section 4(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)] and not exempt under section 4(b)
[29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)].
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
37. The section, I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A), provides: "A trust shall not
constitute a qualified trust under this section unless the plan of which such
trust is a part provides that benefits provided under the plan may not be
assigned or alienated."
38. Pryor, supra note 28, at 71-72. Both the Senate Reports and
Congressional Records, when enacting the pre-emption clauses, indicated
Congress's intent that it have a wide, sweeping effect. See id. at 127 nn.42-43
(quoting from the Senate and Congressional reports that articulated their
apprehension that multiple laws would develop throughout the country,
creating more confusion).
39. Id. at 72.
40. Id.
41. Anthony Michael Sabina & John P. Clarke, The Last Line of Defense:
The New Test for Protecting Retirement Plans from Creditors in Bankruptcy
Cases, 48 ALA. L. REV. 613, 617 (1997). Also, a plan must constitute a pension
plan under ERISA, which defines
the terms "employee pension benefit plan" and "pension plan" [to] mean
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter
established or maintained by an employer or by an employee
organization, or by both, to the extent that by its express terms or as a
result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program(i) provided retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending
to the termination of covered employment or beyond, regardless of
the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the
method of calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of
distributing benefits from the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A). This definition typically includes pension, profitsharing, and 401(k) plans. A plan that exists without any benefit to common
law employees falls outside the definition of an ERISA pension plan. Naegele
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from spending their accrued savings before retirement, it does not
make sense to allow creditors to access it indirectly when the
participant cannot.4 2
C. Down the Tubes: The Bankruptcy Code and
How It Applies to ERISA
In 1978, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act ("the
Code"). One purpose of the new Code was to make it easier for
debtors to discharge debts and embark with a financial "fresh
start."4 This enactment led to the creation of a system of federal
exemptions." At the beginning of a bankruptcy case, the
bankruptcy trustee creates an estate out of all of the debtor's
property, known as the "[piroperty of the estate.' However, under
Section 541(c)(2)" of the Bankruptcy Code, if a debtor cannot
transfer property to a creditor outside of the bankruptcy realm (or
in other words, applicable nonbankruptcy law), then the Code
creates an exclusion, thus exempting the property from the grips
of the creditor. 7 Initially, the courts had difficulty interpreting the
meaning of "applicable nonbankruptcy law."' Some courts
& Altieri, supra note 11.
42. Pryor, supra note 28, at 73. See generally Landis & Kane, supra note 10
(stating that section 206(d) of ERISA reflects congressional intent and a clear
policy choice). Congress enacted ERISA to "safeguard a stream of income for
pensioners (and their dependents, who may be, and perhaps usually are,
blameless), even if that decision prevents others from securing relief for the
wrongs done them" and thereby "create a federal exemption from involuntary
alienation of pension benefits by the adoption of § 206(d)." Id. at 260 & n.32.
43. Pryor, supra note 28, at 66. The Bankruptcy Code provides the debtor a
"proverbial 'fresh start" by protecting some of the debtor's assets from the
bankruptcy estate. Id.
44. Id. Many states, however, opted out of the federal exemptions and kept
their own state exemptions that could still be exercised by individual debtors
in bankruptcy. Id.
45. Sabina & Clarke, supra note 41, at 618. The Bankruptcy Code defines
property of the estate as:
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this
title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following
property, wherever located and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case ....
11 U.S.C. § 541.
46. "A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a
trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in
a case under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2).
47. Sabina & Clarke, supra note 41, at 620.
48. Id. at 620-22. Some courts considered ERISA relevant under the
'applicable nonbankruptcy law" terminology of § 541(c)(2), and therefore found
that the debtor's estate did not include the debtor's assets in the ERISAqualified pension plan under the plan's anti-alienation provision. See id. at
621 (summarizing Gladwell v. Harline (In re Harline) 950 F.2d 669, 674 (10th
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interpreted the phrase to only apply to state law, not federal law.
However, after the Supreme Court decision in Patterson v.
Shumate, "applicable nonbankruptcy law" now refers to state or
federal law, including the anti-alienation clauses mandated by
ERISA. 9
The issue in Yates, however, turns not only on whether
Yates's loan repayment should remain insulated from creditors,
but also whether his plan is a tax-qualified ERISA plan that gains
protection under Title I of ERISA and its anti-alienation clause.
Another question is whether Yates, under ERISA, is considered an
"employer" not eligible for participation in the plan or whether
the
professional corporation is considered the "employer." The Sixth
Circuit found that Yates acted as an "employer"" in the traditional
agency sense of the word. ERISA does not afford an "employer"
protection because only a "participant or beneficiary"51 in an
ERISA tax-qualified pension plan has standing to enforce ERISA,
which makes the anti-alienation clauses under ERISA and
Cir. 1991); Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 1991), affd 504 U.S. 753

(1992); Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362, 364-65 (4th Cir. 1991); Forbes v.
Lucas (In re Lucas), 924 F.2d 597, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1991); Anderson v. Raine
(In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476, 1477-78 (4th Cir. 1990)). Other courts, however,
disagreed and held that ERISA did not apply to the meaning of "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" intended by § 541 since it is federal law. Hence, the antialienation clauses found in ERISA-qualified retirement plans were not
important and could not place these plans outside of bankruptcy creditors'
grips. See id. at 621-22 (synthesizing the holdings of Heitkamp v. Dyke (In re
Dyke), 943 F.2d 1435, 1441 (5th Cir. 1991); Daniel v. Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank (In
re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 1985); Lichstrahi v. Bankers Trust
(In re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1490 (11th Cir. 1985); Samore v. Graham (In
re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1984); Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff),
706 F.2d 574, 580 (5th Cir. 1983)).
49. 504 U.S. 753, 757-59 (1992). In Patterson, the unanimous Supreme
Court found in favor of Shumate, the debtor, holding that Shumate may
exclude from the property of the estate his assets in his retirement plan
because the retirement plan's status qualified under ERISA and § 541(c)(2) of
the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 765-66.
50. According to ERISA, "[tihe term 'employer' means any person acting
directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation
to an employee benefit plan; and includes a group or association of employers
acting for an employer in such capacity." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5). And "[tihe term
'employee' means any individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(6).
51. According to ERISA:
The term "participant" means any employee or former employee of an
employer, or any member or former member of an employee
organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any
type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such
employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may
be eligible to receive any such benefit.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). A beneficiary is "a person designated by a participant, or
by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a
benefit thereunder." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8).
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Tennessee state law" moot in Yates's case." Therefore, the
outcome of this case may have far-reaching implications because it
will not only affect Dr. Yates, but under the arbitrary definition of
"employer," will also impact all other working owners and possibly
even partners and shareholder employees who hold a large portion
of the corporation's stock.
II.

UNDER THE MICROSCOPE: ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW

In order to address these questions, an understanding of the
different courts' interpretations and applications of the multiple
facets of law is a prerequisite. Therefore, this section will examine
several different analyses used throughout this country and relate
them back to the case at hand. First, I will address the several
Supreme Court cases that address some of the sub-issues that
exist in Yates. Second, I will synthesize the various federal circuit
court cases according to the different approaches used. Then, I will
conclude with a summary of the analyses as applied to Yates.
A. Supreme Court Cases Recognize ERISA's Policies but
Ignore CorporatePrinciples
1.

Applicable Non-Bankruptcy Law Includes ERISA

In Patterson v. Shumate, Joseph Shumate worked for
Coleman Furniture Corporation for over thirty years and worked
his way up to the position of president and chairman of the board
of directors.' Coleman provided a qualified retirement plan for
over 400 employees.' Unfortunately, the company filed for
bankruptcy, and soon afterward Shumate followed suit.' The
bankruptcy trustee filed an action in the Western District of
Virginia seeking access to Shumate's assets in the plan for the
benefit of his creditors.57 The trustee claimed that Shumate's plan
in particular did not qualify for an exclusion under § 541(c)(2) of
the Bankruptcy Code because "applicable nonbankruptcy law" only
includes state law, not federal law.' The Supreme Court held that
11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) applies not only to applicable state laws, but
also to federal laws such as ERISA.59 More specifically, the Court
52. TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-105(b) (2000). The statute provides an
exemption for bankruptcy estates retirement assets of a participant or

beneficiary of qualified plans. Id.
53. Hendon, 287 F.3d at 524.
54. 504 U.S. at 755.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 755-56.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 759. The Court, in its analysis of the issue, considered other
references within the Bankruptcy Code. At other places in the legislation,
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found that the anti-alienation provision included in the debtor's
plan document qualified as a restriction on transfers enforceable
as "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under the exclusions of §
541(c)(2) of the Code.60
In Yates, the plaintiff argued that either ERISA or Tennessee
state law qualifies as "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under the
Code, and therefore, the court should enforce the anti-alienation2
provision."' However, the Sixth Circuit found that under ERISA,
Yates acted as an employer and consequently was not entitled to
bring suit under this provision and was not protected by ERISA.'
Therefore, he could not use ERISA as "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" under the Code's exclusion for trusts.'
2. The Terms "Employer"and "Employee"Are Defined by
TraditionalNotions of Agency Law Without Respect to Corporate
Law Policies and the Intent of Congress
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,'

the

Supreme Court confronted the task of construing the term
"employee" under ERISA.' Darden worked as an independent

Congress specifically used the term "state law" when it desired to limit the
scope of the law. Id. at 758. Also, elsewhere in the Code when it refers to
"applicable nonbankruptcy law," courts interpreted it to include federal law.
Id. at 758 n.2.
60. Patterson, 504 U.S. at 760. The Court went so far as to mention that it
has "vigorously... enforced ERISA's prohibition on the assignment or
alienation of pension benefits, declining to recognize any implied exceptions to
the broad statutory bar." Id. It mentioned, as well, that the IRS in the past
expressed its viewpoint on the matter that such a transfer of a beneficiary's
pension plan interest to a bankruptcy trustee would disqualify the plan's
preferential tax treatment under ERISA. Id. at 760 n.3. See also Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987) (finding that ERISA preempts state law
if the state law relates to employee benefit plans); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498
U.S. 52, 65 (1990) (recognizing that Congress clearly intended for ERISA to
preempt state insurance regulation).
61. Hendon, 287 F.3d at 525.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B)(ii). The applicable section in ERISA contains a
description of parties eligible to bring a civil action claiming rights under
ERISA. It provides that only a "participant," "beneficiary," or "fiduciary" may
seek equitable relief to enforce the provisions of the plan. See supra notes 5051 and accompanying text.
63. Hendon, 287 F.3d at 525-26. Yates also argued that section 26-2-105(b)
of the Tennessee Code Annotated makes the spendthrift clause enforceable
under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 526. The Tennessee Personal Property
Owner's Rights and Garnishment Act of 1978 exempts qualified retirement
plans from the debtor's property. Id. The court, however, reasoned that the
Tennessee law "operates without regard to a transfer restriction that may be
contained in the trust instrument," and therefore does not apply. Id. at 526-27.
64. Id. at 524.
65. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6). See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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contractor for the Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company.67 When
his employment ended with the company, he sued for his forfeited
benefits in the company's retirement program.' The question
centered on whether Darden could bring suit under ERISA as a
participant to enforce the provisions of the statute.' The definition
of participant only includes "employees."7" Thus, the case turned
on whether Darden, as an independent contractor, was an
"employee" of Nationwide.7' In resolving this question, the Court
found that the definition used in the text of ERISA was completely
"circular," and instead used basic agency law criteria to create a
common-law test to find the answer." The Court considered, for
example, if a person's position enables them to exert control and
make decisions over other employees, then that person is an
"employer."7 The Court adopted this approach even though it
conflicted with Congress's intent when it enacted ERISA.74
67. Darden, 503 U.S. at 319-20.
68. Id. at 320. Darden claimed that these benefits were already vested

under ERISA and therefore a nonforfeitable right. Id.
69. Id. at 320-21; 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). See also supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
70. See supra note 50 and accompanying text for the definition of
"employee."
71. Darden, 503 U.S. at 321.
72. Id. at 323. As a backing for the Court's interpretation of Congress's

statutory language used in ERISA, it logically reasoned that when presented
with ambiguous statutory language, it will look within the entire text of the
statute. Id. at 322-23. If the statute doesn't clarify the meaning, then the
Court may infer that Congress intended the common law meaning of the term.
Id. In earlier cases, the Court used this method to determine that an
undefined term "employee" when used in a statute means the "conventional
master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine."
Id. See also Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 73841 (1989), which determined the arbitrary term "employee" within the
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101, through the statutory interpretation
process of checking for further definition within the entire text of the statute,
and if none, then applying the common law definition.
73. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323. Some of these factors include: (1) the ability of
the hiring party to dominate the ways in which the end result is achieved; (2)
required job-related skills; (3) who provides the tools needed to accomplish the
job; (4) location of the job; (5) how long the relationship between the parties
existed; (6) authority of the hiring party to assign additional responsibilities;
(7) the decision-making capabilities of the hired party to set the hours of work;
(8) how the hired party gets paid; (9) the ability of the hired party to hire and
pay assistants; (10) the similarity of the work to the hiring party's business;
(11) if the hiring party is in business; (12) any applicable employee benefits
provision; and (13) the hired party's tax treatment. Id. at 323-24. THE

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) provided the court with
additional criteria to determine an employer-employee relationship, along
with some other resources. Id. at 324.
74. Id. at 325, 328. The Court noted, as well, that the Fourth Circuit would
not consider Darden an employee under common law principles. However, the
Fourth Circuit still held that Darden constituted an employee under the
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The holding in Darden affects the issue at hand in Yates,
because if the Supreme Court uses traditional notions of common
law agency to determine whether Yates can bring suit as an
"employee" to enforce ERISA provisions and protections upon his
retirement plan, then Yates will lose. If the Court decides, using
this agency test, that Yates is not an "employee," as did the Sixth
Circuit, then his loan repayments will not fall under the
Bankruptcy Code exclusion under § 541(c)(2) and will instead go to
his creditors."5 This analysis completely ignores well-founded

traditional principles of agency even though it created an inconsistency with
Congress' express policy and purpose of enacting ERISA. Id. at 321.
75. See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 123 S. Ct. 1673,
1681-83 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In Clackamas, the court recognized
a split between circuits concerning who constitutes an "employee" and agreed
to attempt to resolve the issue. Clackamas involved a plaintiff who brought
suit under the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA") against a medical
professional corporation owned by four shareholders. Id. at 1676-77. However,
the ADA does not cover employers with fewer than fifteen employees. Id. at
1676. The decision of whether the ADA covers the defendant hinged upon
whether the four shareholders constituted "employees." Id. at 1677-78. The
Court applied the test set out in Darden and specifically focused on the
common law idea of "control over the servant" as one of the more relevant
factors. Id. at 1680. The Court took the position that courts should examine
whether the shareholders: (1) operate independently; (2) manage the
corporation; or (3) work under the business' control. Id. The Court also took
into account the congressional intent behind the statute, noting that these
considerations should be weighed. Id. at 1678-79. Here, the Court mentioned
two opposing views: (A) the intent of Congress to rid the world of
discrimination suggests that the shareholders are employees; versus (B) the
idea that they are not employees because Congress excluded small employers
in order to promote people to start businesses by making it easier for them to
enter the competitive environment without having the expenses of providing
ADA coverage. Id. Without determining the answer to the issue, the Court
remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals, ordering the court to decide
the case using these factors. Id. at 1681. However, the dissent, written by
Justice Ginsburg, strongly favored another viewpoint. The crux of the dissent
centered upon the fact that the shareholders received payment from the
corporation, rendered services in the name of and for the benefit of the
corporation, and held contracts with the corporation. Therefore, such
shareholders were employees of the corporation. Id. at 1681-82. The dissent
recognized that just because no other human being controls the day-to-day
work of the shareholders, the enterprise controls them in the sense that they
must do certain work and activities for the vitality of the business. Id. at 1682.
One of the primary reasons of setting up the practice as a corporation was to
gain qualification as an "employee" for ERISA protection. Id. Also, the very
reason to organize as a professional corporation is to create a separate entity
from the shareholders to limit liability for the business' debts. Id. All of these
reasons suggest that shareholders in a professional corporation satisfy the
common law principles of agency that define an "employee." Id. Justice
Ginsburg's majority opinion in Yates, then, is not surprising since she
predictably applied the same analysis used in her dissenting opinion in
Glackamas. See also Baker v. Texas & Pacific Railway, 359 U.S. 227, 227-28
(1959) (per curiam), which addressed the issue of who constitutes an
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corporate principles that separate the corporate entity from those
that make decisions on behalf of the corporation."6 It seems that
this analysis would consider any upper-level manager an
"employer" not eligible for the benefits under ERISA, which is
illogical considering the context of ERISA and corporate law
policies."
3. The Firstand Sixth Circuits InterpretERISA to Connote that
Sole Shareholders Cannot Be "Employees"
The Sixth Circuit will not construe the term "employee" under
8
ERISA to include a sole shareholder."
In Fugarino, the court
examined whether the sole proprietor of a restaurant had standing
under ERISA as an employee to bring suit in federal court.79 While
taking into consideration some of ERISA's policies to protect
employees, the court held that the group insurance plan qualified
under ERISA, but that the sole proprietor did not qualify as an
employee and could only sue under state law."° The result of the
decision is that Fugarino can only sue under state law, while the
employees of the restaurant may bring suit under federal law to

"employee" under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and finding that a jury

should determine and weigh the evidence. The district court judge refused to
introduce the evidence to a jury and found that as a matter of law no
employment relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant. Id.
76. See generally Clackamas, 123 S. Ct. at 1681 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(describing in detail why the application of common law agency factors to the
definition of the employer-employee relationship in this context defies the
intent of Congress and corporate law principles).
77. Id. at 1681 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See also William Sluis, Sidley

Austin Brown & Wood: EEOC Files Age-DiscriminationSuit, CHi. TRIB., Jan.
16, 2005, at C3 (reporting that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission filed anti-age discrimination suits against the large Chicago law
firm for demoting or forcing retirement on thirty-one partners to replace them
with younger attorneys). The law firm responded by stating that the partners
were "owners," not "employees," and therefore are not covered by the Antidiscrimination laws. Of course, like the decision in Yates, this case has every
law firm's proverbial ears perked and eyes open. As the article states: "Watch
for this fight to be ferocious, because the stakes are high for numerous firms
that concentrate decision-making authority in a small group of partners." Id.
78. Fugarino, 969 F.2d at 185-86 ("[An employer cannot ordinarily be an
employee or participant under ERISA."). The court stated that a primary
purpose of ERISA's existence was to prevent the employer from benefiting
from the assets of a plan. Congress enacted ERISA to allow only participants
and beneficiaries to use ERISA to recover. Id. at 186.
79. Id. at 178.
80. Id. In Fugarino, the plaintiffs owned a restaurant and provided its
employees with a group health insurance policy. Id. at 181. Plaintiffs son, a
dependent on the policy, became paraplegic in a car accident. Id. Other
restaurant employees participated in the plan. Id. A dispute arose, however,
between plaintiff and the insurance company over the payment of the medical
expenses. Id.
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enforce ERISA protections.8 1
However, in Agrawal, even though the court reached its
decision in a manner consistent with Fugarino, the court
recognized that its holding contradicted the policy considerations
of ERISA because ERISA is meant to encourage and protect all
employees, not to assign different rights to business owners and
employees." Although the Sixth Circuit refuses to find that a sole
shareholder qualifies as an "employee" for ERISA purposes,
multiple shareholders do qualify regardless of the type of business
entity created.u
The First Circuit's analysis aligns with the Sixth Circuit in
that sole owners constitute "employers" under ERISA, not
employees, and therefore do not qualify for Title I coverage. In
81. Id. at 186 "ERISA regulation applies to the employees of The Glens
Restaurant who participate in the group health insurance coverage." Id.
82. Agrawal, 205 F.3d at 303. In Agrawal, a sole shareholder of a
professional corporation purchased three disability policies in the name of
Agrawal, Inc. Id. at 298-99. After sustaining injuries and submitting claims to
defendant-insurer, the defendant stopped payments claiming that Dr. Agrawal
no longer suffered disabilities. Id. at 299. The court also noted that if a sole
proprietor operates a Keogh plan under which no common law employees are
eligible, Title I of ERISA does not cover the sole owner. Id. at 303. However,
Title I of ERISA would cover the working owner if at least one other employee
participates in addition to the owner. Id. Moreover, it found that a limited
definition of ERISA does not further the interests and purposes of the
legislation. Id. This reading of the statute allows self-employed individuals to
sue under state law and employees of working owners to sue under federal law
but not state law. Id. This idea defies logic in that Congress would allow selfemployed individuals a cause of action in state law but force the intended
protected class of employees to go to federal court with their claims. Id. See
Scarborough v. Perez, 870 F.2d 1079, 1084 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that
defendant, Peter Perez, as sole owner of Perez, Inc. did not qualify as an
"employer" by using corporate principles and policies). Absent fraud or
injustice, establishing a closely-held operation as a corporation limits the
liability of the owners and should not subject them to personal liability simply
because they run the business. Id. Finding otherwise "would not only subvert
the major purpose of incorporation, but would discourage future participation
in multiemployer pension plans." Id. It reasoned that Congress knows how to
express when it wants the courts to disregard the fact of incorporation. Id. See
also Hadden v. City of Gatlinburg, 746 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tenn. 1988)
(reasoning that even if one stockholder owns all the stock in a corporation,
"distinct legal entities" still exist). Furthermore, the court found that where
owners choose to do business in the corporate form for tax, accounting, and
various other reasons, they cannot dispose of the corporate form when
convenient. Id. at 690.
83. See Santino v. ProvidentLife & Accident Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 772, 774-75
(6th Cir. 2001), where one of three shareholders in a professional corporation
filed state law claims against the defendant provider of disability insurance,
which argued that he did not qualify as an "employee" under ERISA and was
therefore barred from bringing an ERISA claim. The court held that a joint
shareholder who does not solely or with a spouse own all equity in a
corporation qualifies as an "employee" under ERISA, thereby preempting his
state law claims. Id. at 776.
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Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Service Employees Pension Fund,' the
plaintiff, a sole shareholder of a business, brought an ERISA claim
to force the defendant to pay retirement benefits the company
contributed to the pension plan for his benefit. The court found
that "such 'dual status' individuals are barred from participation"
in an ERISA-regulated pension plan.'
4. The Majority of Circuits ConstrueERISA to Mean that the
Company is the "Employer"Separate from the Owner
While the First and Sixth Circuits consider the sole owner of
a business an "employer,"' the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits recognize the distinction between the owner and
the business entity. Other circuits have not yet clearly decided the
issue.
The Third Circuit decided this issue in Leckey v. Stefano, "
and found that the sole owner of a business qualified as an
"employee-participant" under ERISA because at all times another
employee benefited, even if that other employee was the owner's
step-daughter and co-owner.' According to the court, ERISA
applied so long as another employee participated and benefited in
84. 879 F.2d 957 (1st Cir. 1989). In Kwatcher, the plaintiff owned his own
window washing business and presided over all employee contractual and
bargaining matters. Id. at 958. It is interesting to note that the plaintiff-owner
belonged to an employees' union as himself, and his company belonged to an
employers' organization. Id. The company made contributions to a pension
fund on plaintiffs behalf. Id.
85. Id. at 959. The court reasoned that in actuality, if a person controls the
corporation's actions, it seems only fair to concede that he acts "in the interest
of" the business entity and is therefore classified as an "employer." Id. at 960.
86. Compare Schwartz v. Gordon, 761 F.2d 864, 865 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding
that Title I of ERISA did not apply to a sole owner who maintained,
contributed, and benefited from the plan himself), and LaVenture v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 237 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that the sole
shareholders of a company constitute "employers" under the ERISA definition
when the disability plan benefits no one other than the owner, therefore
ERISA does not preempt the plaintiffs claim), with Peterson v. Am. Life &
Health Ins. Co., 48 F.3d 404, 406-09 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff,
a partner whose company provided health insurance for the benefit of the
other partner and another employee, constituted an "employee" for reasons of
ERISA to bring suit in federal court because finding otherwise would create an
ironic situation of requiring individuals under the same policy to pursue
claims in different court systems), and Watson v. Proctor, 161 F.3d 593, 59899 (9th Cir. 1998) (deciding that the debtor's interest in his retirement plan
did not qualify as an employee benefit plan under ERISA because the
debtor/sole shareholder remained the only person who contributed and
benefited from the plan). Therefore, under ERISA, he did not qualify as an
"employee" able to bring suit and enjoy the protections of Title I, which meant
that he must include his savings as property of the estate under § 541(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code. Id.
87. 263 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2001).
88. Id. at 272.
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the plan.89
Likewise, the Fourth Circuit found that a sole proprietor who
employed four other full-time workers and assisted in providing
health insurance coverage for its employees qualified as a
"beneficiary" and "participant" of the employee benefit plan and
possessed rights to sue under ERISA. ° In deciding the issue, the
court reasoned that if an employee of the solely-owned corporation
sued the plaintiff as an "employer" under ERISA, the corporation
would deflect his liability. 91
The Fifth Circuit, in Vega v. National Life Insurance Services,

Inc.,9' also concluded that a co-owner in a corporation falls within
the ERISA definition because the corporation employs at least one
other person. 3 It found that "[a]s long as a Texas business
corporation maintains a plan and at least one employee
participant (other than a shareholder or a spouse of the
shareholder), an employee shareholder and his beneficiaries may
be participants in the plan with standing to bring claims under
ERISA."9 4
The Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits' decisions parallel
the above-mentioned circuit decisions.9 All of these cases show a
89. Id. at 271-72. The court's analysis used the rule laid out in a
Department of Labor's regulation in 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(c)(1) that says "an
individual and the individual's spouse are not counted as employees for
purposes of identifying an ERISA plan" if one individual or the individual and
his or her spouse wholly owns the business. Id. at 270. This rule only prevents
spouses from becoming employees. Id. at 271. See also Wolk v. UNUM Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 186 F.3d 352, 353, 358 (3d Cir. 1999) (deciding that the term
"beneficiary" encompasses partner-employers meant to benefit under an
employee benefit plan and they therefore have standing to enforce the plan
provisions under ERISA).
90. Madonia v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 11 F.3d 444, 450 (4th Cir. 1993).
91. Id. The court also recognized that by holding that the sole shareholder
qualifies as an "employee" who can benefit from the plan, the decision would
enhance uniformity of laws by preventing two different court systems from
hearing matters having to do with the same policy/plan, which is consistent
with Congress' intent when enacting ERISA. Id.
92. 188 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 1999).
93. Id. at 294.
94. Id.
95. See generally In re Baker, 114 F.3d 636, 639 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding
that § 541(c)(2) excludes the debtor's pension plan because the courts must
respect corporate existence and recognize that the corporation and owner are
two separate legal entities. Therefore the owner is considered an "employee"
with rights under ERISA); Sipma v. Mass. Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 1006, 101011 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that the shareholder in the corporation acts as an
employee under the Darden analysis used by the Supreme Court and
recognizing that people and corporations are two separate legal entities
recognized at law); Gilbert v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 1292, 1302
(11th Cir. 2001) (deciding that a "sole shareholder is a "beneficiary," within
the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8), when he is entitled to benefits from a
benefits plan which otherwise qualifies as an ERISA plan); Slamen v. Paul
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trend that a majority of courts now hold that: (1) if a sole owner of
a corporation or partnership provides an employee benefit plan
within the definition of ERISA, and (2) the plan benefits other
employees aside from the sole working owner and the owner's
spouse, then (3) the owner will qualify as an "employee" distinct
from the corporation and therefore fall within the protections of
Title I of ERISA with standing to enforce those provisions. The
First and Sixth Circuits' holdings, when confronted with this
matter, rejected many of the policy decisions used by the majority
of the circuits. For instance, the courts did not take into account
basic corporate principles and the purposes of ERISA to provide
for uniformity of laws and encourage owners to assist employees in
providing health, disability, and retirement plans. If we take away
the incentives for owners to offer these retirement benefits, then
the effect is a decrease in the amount of benefit plans offered to
the employees, which just ends up hurting the very employees that
ERISA seeks to protect.
The First and Sixth Circuits, furthermore, do not treat the
corporate entity and the owner as legally separate entities. The
corporation may make transactions, file taxes, and buy and sell
land as an independent legal "person." The money, taxes, and
income streams are all kept entirely separate from the sole
shareholder. The owner even gets paid by the corporation.
Therefore, the corporation is constructively "the boss" and the
owner acts on its behalf.
III.
A.

THINK OUTSIDE THE

Box:

PROPOSED CHANGES

CorporationPolicies Warranta Legal Separationof the
Business and the Owner

In Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells,'
Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority's application of
traditional common law principles to determine whether a sole
owner is an "employee" or an "employer."97 Justice Ginsburg
faulted the majority's analysis, which applied common law agency
factors of control.9" Because the four shareholders of a professional
corporation controlled the operation of the clinic, the doctors were
considered "employers" under the Darden test.' While Justice
Revere Life Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 1102, 1106 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
sole owner in this case did not constitute an "employee" under ERISA because
the disability plan only covered himself and no other employees).
96. 123 S.Ct. 1673, 1681-83 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 1681 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 1680 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 1681 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Recall that the Court in Darden
ascertained the definition of "employee" by applying common law agency
principals to determine who is or who is not an employee, with no one factor
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Ginsburg did not dispute the application of common law principles
of a master-servant relationship, she disagreed with the majority
because they placed too much emphasis on just one of the factorscontrol.'
Justice Ginsburg also pointed out that the shareholders in
this professional corporation go to work every day functioning as
common law employees.'0' She noted various state and federal laws
that classify the doctors as employees for various reasons. 10' She
stressed that the doctors fit the common law definition of an
"employee" or "servant" because the doctors engaged in services for
the benefit of the corporation and in the practice's name, were
bound by contracts with the corporation, received salaries and
bonuses from the corporation, and worked in facilities owned or
leased in the name of the corporation."' While the doctors in that
case argued that they did not qualify as "employees" under the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA)-which uses the exact
same definition as "employee" in ERISA-they conceded that they
qualified as "employees" under ERISA."' The shareholders even
agreed that qualifying themselves as "employees" under ERISA is
what led them to choose to organize as a corporation instead of
something else, like a partnership."0 '
Most importantly, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that by
organizing the practice in the form of a corporation, the doctors in
effect "created an entity separate and distinct from themselves,
one that would afford them limited liability for the debts of the
enterprise."" Altogether, she found "no reason to allow the doctors
to escape from their choice of corporate form when the question
becomes whether they are employees for purposes of federal anti-

more determinative than another. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg thought the majority's

application of this test too narrow. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
101. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 1682 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1681-82 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She also referenced the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, ch. 7 topic 2, tit. B, Introductory Note, at
479, which said, in essence, that employees positioned "high up" in a
corporation "are no less servants because they are not controlled in their day-

to-day work by other human beings. Their physical activities are controlled by
their sense of obligation to devote their time and energies to the interests of
the enterprise." Id. at 1682 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This statement alone
presents evidence against the majority's application of only one common law

factor of agency law.
104. Id. at 1682 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). See Sluis, supra note 77
(referencing Sidley Austin's defense to the anti-discrimination charges that
the partners were not "employees" entitled to protection pursuant to the
federal anti-discrimination laws because they were considered partners and
owners in the law firm).

105. Clackamas, 123 S.Ct. at 1682 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
106. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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discrimination statutes."0 7
In other cases addressing similar issues, corporate policies
have swayed several courts' decisions. In Scarbrough v. Perez, the
Sixth Circuit remarked that the definition of "employer" under
ERISA would be "foolhardy" if it included the dominant
shareholder and chief officer of a corporation as an employer
because he acted "indirectly in the interest of the employer.""° The
court admitted that such an interpretation would mean that every
person who exerts control and responsibility over the employee
benefits plan qualifies as an "employer."" 9 "Obviously Congress did
not contemplate that," stated the court."' The opinion's very
pointed analysis went on to say that "limited liability is a
hallmark of corporate law""' and that owners do not subject
themselves to corporate liability just by actively participating in
the business."' To find otherwise, the court "would not only
subvert the major purpose of incorporation, but would discourage
future participation" in pension plans."'
Overall, by establishing a business in corporate form, such as
a professional corporation, several factors enter the decisionmaking process. Owners of businesses incorporate to separate
themselves from the corporation to limit personal liability."' To
find that the sole owner of a company qualifies as an "employer"
would not only go against the principle of separation of owner and
company for tax, accounting, leasing, and other reasons, but it
would also allow the sole owner and the court to "shunt aside at
their convenience legal entities and the legal aspects thereof.""'
107. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

108. 870 F.2d at 1083.
109. Id.
110. Id. (internal citations omitted).
111. Id. at 1084. (internal citations omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Connors v. P & M Coal Co., 801 F.2d 1373, 1376 (D.C. Cir.
1986)).
114. Hadden v. City of Gatlinburg, 746 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tenn. 1988). Even

if one person owns all of the stock in a company, the stockholder and the
corporation are still "distinct legal entities." Id. That sole shareholder may not
even bring a suit when wrongs are done to the corporation. Id.
115. Id. at 690 (quoting Shelby County v. Barden, 527 S.W.2d 124, 130
(Tenn. 1975)). See also Madonia, 11 F.3d at 449 (using the Darden common
law agency factor test, and noting that Virginia recognized the distinction
between a corporation as a legal entity and the shareholders). In Madonia,the

court held that Dr. Madonia, sole shareholder in his incorporated medical
practice, qualified as an "employee" under ERISA because the employee
welfare benefit plan benefited employees in his office other than his spouse.

Id. Therefore, Dr. Madonia was held subject to ERISA as an "employee" and
his business the "employer." Id. at 449-50. The court also went on to opine that
since self-employed persons decide to incorporate and employ other people, no
reason exists to disregard the corporate form. Id. at 450. There are recognized

benefits that come along with the corporate form, such as limited liability and
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Applying these principles to Dr. Yates's situation, for
purposes of ERISA the law should recognize Raymond B. Yates,
M.D., P.C. distinctly from Dr. Raymond B. Yates. After all, the tax
credits were enjoyed by the practice, not Yates himself. Under
Sixth Circuit precedent, if he invited one other person to become a
shareholder in his business, it would change his pension status to
that of an "employee."" 6 This approach, then, effectively removes
the reasons for incorporating as a sole shareholder. Nowhere in
corporate law does it suggest that sole shareholders should be
treated differently than businesses owned by more than one
shareholder. Therefore, to ensure that all businesses and business
owners are awarded equal treatment, courts must consistently
treat the two entities as legally separate. This approach would
promote efficiency within our judicial system, reduce confusion as
to the benefits of incorporating, and encourage more business
owners to incorporate. This distinction between company and
owner as "employer" and "employee," respectively, would also
support one of ERISA's primary purposes-the uniformity of laws
for employee benefits.
B. ERISA Policies Promote Protectionof Retirement Plan Savings
Admittedly, ERISA came into being in response to several
employers taking advantage of retirement plans for their own
individual purposes." 7 Congress passed ERISA primarily to ensure
that the retirement benefits promised by employers to their
employees would be there for them upon retirement. 118 However,
ERISA currently addresses a broader range of issues in order to
protect retirement benefits. For instance, it not only protects
employees from their employers through various disclosure
requirements,"9 but it also insulates these benefits from the reach
of creditors in case of bankruptcy, so that the retirement money
remains for the benefit of the participants. 2' Exposing the
tax deductions. Id. If an employee sued Dr. Madonia, the corporate form would
insulate him. Id. Since the corporation and the owner are treated separately in
other areas of the law, they should be treated separately here. Id.
116. Santino v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 772, 776 (6th
Cir. 2001). Santino was one of three physician-shareholders in Wayne-Macomb

Urology Associates P.C. Id. at 774. The court found that Sixth Circuit
precedent limits sole shareholders as "employers." Id. at 776. Therefore,

because the business had three shareholders, Santino qualified as an
"employee" for ERISA purposes and had standing to sue under ERISA. Id.
117. Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 959.
118. Patterson,504 U.S. at 764-65.

119. Litman, supra note 27, at 639. ERISA requires many disclosure and
reporting requirements, "minimum participation, vesting, and funding
standards, and fiduciary obligations on plan trustees and administrators." Id.
120. Id. at 637-38. Congress attempted to preserve retirement benefits by

instituting the very statutory clause under issue, which prevents voluntary or
involuntary assignment of benefits. Id. at 639.
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retirement assets to creditors subverts Congress's intent to
encourage both owners and non-owners alike to save for
retirement. Plenty of measures exist that achieve the protection of
these concerns-both the monitoring of the employers and
separating retirement funds from the eligible bankruptcy money
pot. The outcome of the controversy in regards to whether a sole
owner is an "employer" or an "employee" under ERISA will not
increase the chances of owner misuse. However, the outcome will
affect other ERISA policies, such as separating corporate entities
from owners,12' promoting companies to help provide for employee
benefits, 122 encouraging all participants to save more for
retirement, 123 and smoothing the legal playing field, thus forcing
all employees, owners and non-owners alike, to use the federal
system. 124
The distinction between the owner and the corporation has
far-reaching effects on several other areas of the law, bankruptcy
being only one example.1 2 ' Bankruptcy law is designed to give
debtors a new beginning."2 While it's true that the bankruptcy
process in itself tries to maximize payments to creditors, an even
more important policy consideration is the protection of the future
income streams of retirees. 7

121. Scarborough, 870 F.2d at 1084.
122. Madonia, 11 F.3d at 450.
123. Litman, supra note 27, at 640.

124. Agrawal, 205 F.3d at 303. In this Sixth Circuit's opinion, the court
agreed that its rationale, although handcuffed by precedent, did not logically
coincide with ERISA principles. Id. The court noted specifically that by forcing
a self-employed person to be governed by state law and everyone else by
federal law, the law affords different people different remedies. Id.
125. Litman, supra note 27, at 638. Litman addressed the issue by

recognizing that the classification of an individual's employment status under
ERISA will ultimately affect determinations under the Internal Revenue Code
and the Bankruptcy Code. Id. As discussed previously regarding the Sidley
Austin anti-discrimination lawsuit, supra note 77, since other massive
legislative enactments designed to protect employees include similar, if not
identical, definitions of "employer" and "employee," this decision will

ultimately trickle into those cases' mainstream analyses.
126. See Dilley, supra note 30, at 370 (stating that the purpose of
bankruptcy is to maximize the repayment to creditors while giving debtors a

fresh start).
127. Patterson, 504 U.S. at 764-65. The Court focused more upon the
uniformity of treatment to individuals through different court systems. Id. at
765. Other concerns of the Court consisted of equal treatment of pension
benefits no matter the beneficiary's bankruptcy status. Id. at 764. It stated
that the Court previously refused to recognize exceptions to the anti-alienation
provision of ERISA outside the bankruptcy realm. Id. By minimizing
exceptions within the bankruptcy area, the Court effectively minimizes the
chance that creditors would take advantage of bankruptcy laws to gain access

to otherwise inaccessible funds. Id.
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C. Statutory Changes Will Clear the Way to a More Certain
Futurefor Business Owners and the Courts
Simply finding in favor of Yates or Hendon, I fear, may not
solve future problems. It seems that much confusion exists about
the definition of "employee" and "employer" in many different
contexts. For example, the ADA and ERISA use the same
definition of "employee"-"an individual employed by an
employer. " " Therefore, it seems appropriate for Congress to
redefine these terms so that the courts may better interpret
Congress' intent.m For instance, it would not be difficult for
Congress to provide a list of exceptions as to who does not fit
within the definition of "employee." Adding a "laundry list" of
examples to the statutory definition would prevent a lot of future
litigation. There is a limited amount of agency-type relationships
in existence.3 Congress could simply identify which organizations
it desires to protect under ERISA. As business relationships
change, Congress could easily adjust the appropriate statutory
provisions to reflect those changes."'
IV. CLOCKING OUT

ERISA, the Bankruptcy Code, the Internal Revenue Code,
and state laws, when analyzed together, lead to a great deal of
128. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6). This verbiage also appears in
26 U.S.C. § 51(i)(2) (defining nonqualified employees for the amount of credit
allowed under the Internal Revenue Code); id. § 1396(d)(2)(C)-(E) (defining
which employees are not eligible for a qualified zone employment credit); 29
U.S.C. § 152 (3) (describing "employee" with the above language, but also
specifically noting that a person working for a spouse or parent or an
independent contractor does not qualify in terms of the National Labor
Relations Act); id. § 203(e)(1) (defining "employee" the same way under the
Fair Labor Standards Act, except also listing several express exceptions as to
who does not qualify as an employee). See also id. § 402(f) (setting out
definitions for the procedures and requirements for labor-management
disclosure); id. § 630 (f) (defining employee within the Age Discrimination in
Employment chapter); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (using that definition of employee
for the purposes of promoting equal employment opportunities). See generally
Sluis, supra note 77 (exemplifying the continuing need for more accurate
definitions as evidenced by Sidley Austin's argument that its partners, as
owners, are not covered by the age discrimination statutes).
129. See generally Litman, supra note 27, at 697-700 (remarking on proposed
legislative reform and summarizing the difficulties when trying to provide
symmetry between ERISA, the Bankruptcy Code, and the Internal Revenue
Code).
130. See id. at 685-86 (recognizing that Congress left a gap "as to whether a
plan that only covers a sole owner or partners and spouses was included or
excluded" from ERISA protections).
131. See generally Dilley, supra note 30, at 405-06.
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confusion, and perhaps a lot of headaches." 2 Through all of this
confusion, it all comes down to one question: "Who's the boss?"
Only one interpretation results in an equitable relationship
between saving for retirement and preserving corporate policy,
that is, to infer that the employer is the company. After analyzing
the applicable statutory codes, past precedent, and agency and
corporate principles, it is the only connotation that balances all of
the laws and policies. The alternative interpretation, that the
owner is an employee, obliterates the many goals and policies
discussed in this article. In lieu of statutory changes, the answer
provided by the Supreme Court will suffice: The corporation is the
boss, not Yates. However, that answer takes us up only one rung
on the ladder to a clear answer of how people in ownership-type
positions are to be treated under employee-protection laws.

132. See id. at 370 (entitling one of the sections of her Article "A Statutory
Maze: BaAkruptcy, Tax, and Pension Law Intertwined"). "The interplay
among these four sets of statutes, and the varying interpretations of the
relationship, are a principal source of confusion about how retirement
accounts are and ought to be protected against creditors' claims. Id. See also
Kwatcher, 879 F.2d at 958-59 (making many references, both in a literary and
legal sense, to the confusing nature of this area of the law).

